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The initial part of this discussion concluded 
that the many responses to the publications of 
Fritz Fischer broadened the debate on the origins 
of the war of 1914. Another example of this creative 
widening of the discussion is the highly percep-
tive exchange in 1971/72 between Joachim Remak 
and Paul Schroeder.1 A decade later, the analysis of 
Germany offered by David E. Kaiser drew further 
attention to the deficiencies in British policy.2 In 
England, A. J. A. Morris drew attention, in con-
siderable detail, to matters half-forgotten: “radi-
cal” concerns about the direction of British foreign 
policy after 1901, and the growth of an increasing-
ly strident anti-German lobby within the British 
commercial and political elites.3 The latter was ex-
pressed at the highest level in the famous “Crowe 
Memorandum” of August 1, 1907.4 
Arguably an early turning point in the func-
tioning of the European states system took place 
with the collapse in the late 1880s of the diplomatic 
alignment known as the “three emperors’ league.” It 
was developed by the then Chancellor of Germany, 
Otto von Bismarck (1815-98). This Dreikaiserbund 
brought together Germany, Austria-Hungary, and 
Russia. After Bismarck’s triumph over France in 
1870-71, Bismarck’s policy was one of peace and 
security. The Dreikaiserbund ensured that an iso-
lated France was unable to cause serious trouble 
for the new German Empire, founded in 1871. In 
spite of strains, the Dreikaiserbund was effective for 
much of the 1870s and 1880s. For the time being, 
it ensured the diplomatic and military isolation of 
France. However, it came to grief, especially after 
the forced retirement of Bismarck in 1890, because 
of German inability to reconcile Austro-Russian 
rivalry in the Balkans. Forced by circumstances to 
choose between Austria and Russia, Germany chose 
Austria for both geo-political and cultural reasons.
The somewhat incongruous consequence of 
Russia’s alienation from Germany’s pro-Austrian 
orientation was the formation of the Franco-
Russian Alliance by 1894.5 Henceforth Germany 
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and Austria, the “central powers” (later forming a 
“Triple Alliance” with Italy) were confronted by 
a Franco-Russian combination to the west and 
east respectively. The “militarism” of Germany—
largely inherited from Prussia—may be at least 
partly explained by her central position in Europe. 
Germany was the only great power in Europe that 
had a common frontier with three other great pow-
ers.6 Strengthened by their alliance with Russia, 
successive French governments now sought to de-
tach Italy from her association with the “central 
powers” and harbored the ambition of re-acquiring 
the provinces of Alsace-Lorraine (lost in 1871)—
an objective impossible to contemplate without a 
general war. 
The emergent Franco-Russian alliance was of 
deep concern to Great Britain. Acting in concert, 
these two powers could challenge the position of 
Great Britain in Africa and Asia respectively. At the 
same time, any prospect of an Anglo-German align-
ment came to nothing—notwithstanding royal, 
spiritual, and cultural ties. Great Britain could not 
provide Germany with aid in the military protec-
tion of her land frontiers, while Germany could not 
support Great Britain in Asia or Africa. The initial 
development of the German high-seas fleet can be 
viewed as an attempt to gain greater leverage in her 
relations with Great Britain. Germany was never in 
a position to challenge British maritime supremacy 
in this period.
In the 1980s, Paul Kennedy, in two densely ar-
gued studies, discerned that British entry into the 
1914 conflict was, in truth, driven by her Franco-
Russian commitments and fear of German indus-
trial strength and success, rather than by honor-
able concerns for Belgian neutrality.7 In practice, 
once attention was properly widened beyond the 
German violation of Belgian neutrality, the ques-
tion of Russian policy objectives (and British per-
ceptions thereof) in the pre-August 1914 situation 
could never be excluded from any adequate discus-
sion on the outbreak of the war.8 For Great Britain, 
her relations with Russia in central Asia, where the 
security of India was of paramount consideration, 
were both fraught and delicate.9 
As the generation of Fischer enthusiasts passed 
from the English scene, a much more nuanced 
analysis of the period 1904-14 was offered by Keith 
Wilson in a series of studies marked by considerable 
depth and perception. In recent decades, Wilson 
has done more than any other English historian to 
open up discussion on these issues.10 And the con-
text changed. In 1989 the Berlin Wall came down, 
and in 1991 the Soviet Union collapsed. Access to 
Russian archives is still not easy but is not impos-
sible. Certainly, our view of what Butterfield called 
“the Russian connection” is now more detailed 
than in his lifetime. A steady flow of studies more 
than confirms his mid-century assertions and vin-
dicates Gooch’s 1929 pointed cross-questioning 
of Grey.11 The sometimes flamboyantly outspoken 
Niall Ferguson has offered an account that is delib-
erately counter-Fischer and critical of the policy of 
Edward Grey.12 
Into the 1890s, British policy concerning alli-
ances was characterized as “splendid isolation.” In 
the new century, however, Great Britain changed 
her posture dramatically. On January 30, 1902 she 
signed an alliance with the Empire of Japan.13 On 
April 4, 1904 she entered into a series of “friendly 
understandings,” known as the Entente Cordiale, 
with France; these addressed a wide range of 
outstanding issues. As if this were not dramatic 
enough, she signed a Convention with Russia on 
August 31, 1907. In other words, by 1907 Great 
Britain had come to close “understandings” with 
her old enemies in Europe and Asia respectively.14 
These considerations present us with a funda-
mental question: Why did Great Britain, after the 
turn of the century, abandon its policy of “splendid 
isolation” and become involved in the rival alliance 
systems of the continental great powers, adherence to 
which were to draw her seemingly inexorably into war 
in 1914?
Arguably, the British acted 
the part of Ahab, who, 
although he already had much 
wealth, coveted and seized 
Naboth’s vineyard (I Kings 
21.1-28).
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Before answering this question, we need to 
emphasize three points. First, as we have noted, 
France and Russia had already developed a full 
and close military alliance. Great Britain did not 
join this alliance formally, wishing to enjoy some 
continued freedom of action. The result was that 
she was always in some measure an outsider, France 
and Russia down to 1914 having a much closer re-
lationship with each other than with Great Britain. 
A further consequence was that the British found 
themselves enduring the disadvantages of an alli-
ance without the full advantages of alliance mem-
bership. Second, with British friendship assured, 
France might become more emboldened towards 
Germany, and Russia towards Austria Hungary. 
Third, a growing sense of “encirclement,” coupled 
with statistics that suggested an increasing relative 
military inferiority, might serve to drive Germany 
and / or Austria Hungary towards desperate mea-
sures. 
If these were the ramifications of the British 
change in policy, they were not its cause and mo-
tivation. It was the empire-minded governing 
Conservative Party, with Lord Lansdowne (1845-
1927) as Foreign Secretary, that initiated immense 
changes in British foreign policy commencing in 
1902. The same policy was continued, after 1905, 
by their archrivals, the Liberal Party, led initially 
by Henry Campbell-Bannerman (1836-1908) and 
after 1908 by H.H. Asquith (1852-1928). A key to 
this apparent contradiction is that the Liberal Party 
was a coalition of groupings and opinions, and that 
the Foreign Secretary, Edward Grey, and Asquith, 
his Prime Minister for most of the relevant peri-
od, were members of the group within the party 
known as the “Liberal Imperialists.”15 Their views 
on domestic policy differed substantially from that 
of their Conservative predecessors, but their gen-
eral outlook on foreign and imperial policy did not.
Historians can fall victims to the categories 
that they use to organize the vast amounts of in-
formation that they have to address. Sometimes the 
categories reflect the organization of government 
departments. In this case, it is important not to or-
ganize our understanding of the formulation and 
implementation of high policy in this period into 
separate domestic, foreign, and imperial policy cat-
egories. We might call this “the fallacy of separate 
mental boxes.” To answer the fundamental ques-
tion posed above, the too often unstated truth is 
that Great Britain’s turn towards an alliance (with 
Japan) and “understandings” (with France and 
Russia) arose from her experience of the dangers of 
international diplomatic isolation at the time of the 
South African War of 1899-1902. 
This reality can be missed, thanks to the “sepa-
rate mental boxes” fallacy. For example, in the 
1960s, the scholar G.W. Monger rightly focused on 
1900-07 as the crucial period of policy change, but 
without sufficiently considering the significance 
of the South African conflict for the momentous 
changes in British foreign policy that he explored.16 
This oversight was as understandable as it was 
problematic. The South African conflict could be 
classified as “imperial-colonial” rather than “for-
eign.” Certainly, the supremacy of the Royal Navy 
prevented other powers from intervening, in spite 
of the widespread international disapproval of the 
British action. In addition, not only has the “Great 
War” of 1914 overshadowed its predecessor, but 
crucial documents concerning the fomenting of the 
1899 conflict were also long to surface.17 
In the United Kingdom the Public Records Act 
(1958) as now applied provides for the release of 
all but the most sensitive government documents 
after thirty years—the “thirty years rule.” Prior to 
its full operation, public access to documents could 
take very much longer. It should not be too great 
a surprise that documents relating to the British 
high-level decision-making that led up to the out-
break of the (second) South African War (the “Boer 
War”) in 1899 were for a long time unavailable. It 
was only in the early 1950s that Ethel Drus pub-
lished a series of pieces traversing the period from 
the Jameson Raid of 1895/6 to the outbreak of war 
in 1899. These pointed to the complicity of Joseph 
Chamberlain (1836-1914), Secretary of State for 
the Colonies in the crucial period 1895-1903),18 
along with Cecil Rhodes (1853-1902)19 and later 
Alfred Milner (1854-1925),20 in provoking military 
conflict with the Afrikaner republics.21 In her wake 
came important work by J.S. Marais, G.H.L. Le 
May, and more recently A.N. Porter and Iain R. 
Smith.22 
The truth is that the driving principle of British 
policy in South Africa was not the civil rights of the 
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uitlanders (non-citizens working in and under the 
jurisdiction of the Transvaal) as such. It was actu-
ally about possession and control of the Great Reef, 
with its immense bounty of gold and diamonds.23 
This was a war of imperial aggression, in which 
the British Empire waged war on two small and 
remote republics. The plight of small nations was 
as nothing when imperial objectives were in view. 
Arguably, the British acted the part of Ahab, who, 
although he already had much wealth, coveted and 
seized Naboth’s vineyard (I Kings 21.1-28). 
The policy of aggression in South Africa pur-
sued by the ruling Conservatives provoked consid-
erable opposition within Great Britain. The sum-
mer of 1899 was one of high tension, with families 
and communities deeply divided over what was 
happening. Radicals, Free Churchmen, and Free 
Presbyterians opposed their government’s poli-
cies and were labeled “Pro-Boers” for their stand. 
Campbell-Bannerman, the future Prime Minister, 
was to accuse the British government in parliament 
of employing “methods of barbarism” in South 
Africa.24 In his latter years Abraham Kuyper (1837-
1920), sometime Prime Minister of the Netherlands 
(1901-6), was no friend of Great Britain and ever 
cautious as to her intentions. Accordingly, he in-
clined towards Imperial Germany. The basis of 
his caution was British aggression against the 
Transvaal. He sympathized with the predicament 
of the South African republics for both ethnic and 
confessional reasons.25 
To recap, by 1914 Great Britain had aligned it-
self with France and Russia, essentially for reasons 
of imperial security. This alignment was not about 
Belgium. That was why maintaining a policy ac-
ceptable to Russia was so important, as Butterfield 
rightly discerned. What Butterfield did not explore 
in any depth was why this change in high policy 
became so necessary after 1902. The answer is the 
strong international reaction against British action 
in South Africa. Arguably, fear of being overtaken 
in many key areas by Germany and or the United 
States spurred the British down the path of yet more 
expansion in order to try to compensate, but her ac-
tions brought about a level of isolation that was not 
“splendid” but dangerous. Therefore, Great Britain 
formed her alliance with Japan and “understand-
ings” with France and Russia. The latter were al-
ways problematic at best and dangerous at worst. In 
1912 Winston S. Churchill (1874-1965), then First 
Lord of the Admiralty, wrote to his Prime Minister, 
Asquith, rightly complaining that “Everyone must 
feel, who knows the facts, that we have all the ob-
ligations of an alliance, without its advantages and 
above all without its precise definitions.”26
On May 26, 1911 Grey advised the Prime 
Ministers of the British Dominions,27 “we are not 
committed by entanglements which tie our hands. 
Our hands are free.”28 This was not strictly true. 
Grey may have been being disingenuous, or may 
have deceived others, having first in some measure 
been self-deceived. The truth is that a close align-
ment with France, and especially with Russia, 
would not have been acceptable to many in the 
ruling Liberal Party, including many members of 
Asquith’s cabinet. The “Liberal Imperialist” faction 
within the Liberal Party controlled the actual con-
duct of foreign policy because it included the Prime 
Minister and the Foreign Secretary. When the 
great crisis arose in July 1914, with Grey having to 
address the House of Commons under conditions 
of high tension, Great Britain would have found it 
extraordinarily difficult to discharge its actual and 
largely secret obligations to France and Russia if 
Germany had not invaded Belgium. 
In effect, Great Britain had to go to war in 
Europe in 1914 because of the alignments that she 
had formed arising from her aggression in South 
Africa and in order to protect her over-extended 
empire.29 It was Ahab’s successors who endured the 
judgmental consequences of his crime. There was 
a strong connection between British aggressions in 
In effect, Great Britain 
had to go to war in Europe 
in 1914 because of the 
alignments that she had 
formed arising from her 
aggression in South Africa 
and in order to protect her 
over-extended empire.
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Southern Africa and the fearful bloodletting that 
the British endured on the western front in 1914-
18. God is not mocked—we reap what we sow, al-
though perhaps with mitigation if we repent quick-
ly. If in 1918-19 Great Britain and France emerged 
victorious, theirs was only a pyric victory. They 
were both severely weakened. Great Britain lost its 
preeminent position. The true beneficiaries were 
the United States and the Empire of Japan. Even 
without a Great War, it is most likely that Great 
Britain would have experienced a relative decline 
in the twentieth century as other leading nations 
closed the gap in the immense lead Great Britain 
had opened up in the earlier nineteenth century. 
Arguably, one of the worst things that may be 
said of the Lansdowne-Grey policy is that it em-
boldened the Franco-Russian Alliance to the point 
where Germany and Austria felt driven into a cor-
ner and overly inclined to risk preemptive conflict. 
Under such circumstances, Austria—confronted 
with the assassinations in Sarajevo on June 28, 
1914—would naturally adopt a stridently severe 
“anti-terrorist” stance against Serbia, viewing it as 
necessary for the retention of her status as a great 
power. Serbia, whose hands were far from clean, ap-
pealed successfully to Russia, the first Great Power 
to mobilize its forces against other great powers 
in 1914. And so it was that all domestic efforts to 
keep Great Britain out of the conflict failed. Great 
Britain was committed because of “entanglements” 
previously incurred for essentially imperial reasons. 
On the other hand, it is possible to argue that with-
out such “entanglements,” she may have been able 
to act as a credible “honest broker” and play the 
part of an effective mediator and peacemaker. 
These entanglements and their implications 
prompt further questions: Was the great wave of 
British imperial assertiveness in the late nineteenth 
century inevitable? Was there another path open to 
Great Britain at that time? Such questions inevita-
bly direct our attention to the great public policy 
debate, conducted in parliament and beyond, be-
tween Benjamin Disraeli (1804-81)30 and William 
Ewart Gladstone (1809-98).31 Disraeli, later Earl 
Beaconsfield (Conservative), stood for crown and 
empire and was Prime Minister from 1874 to 
1880. It was he who gave Queen Victoria the title 
“Empress of India.” Gladstone (Liberal) stood for 
liberty and commerce and was Prime Minister 
from 1868-74, 1880-86, and finally 1892-4. 
Intellectually, Gladstone combined classical schol-
arship with Christian conviction. He was a High 
Church Anglican with a strong Augustinian orien-
tation. The confrontation between the two leaders 
attained a high intensity in the late 1870s, reach-
ing its peak in Gladstone’s “Midlothian campaign” 
speeches of 1879.32 The issue seemed to come to 
this: was an Ottoman Empire that repeatedly treat-
ed the Christian peoples of the Balkans with calcu-
lated cruelty to be upheld for the sake of protecting 
British imperial interests against Russia? This issue 
could be construed as a confrontation of Rechtsstaat 
against Machtstaat, right against might, or liberty 
against empire.33 
Gladstone encouraged the rise of responsible 
self-government in Great Britain’s colonies of 
settlement.34 He presciently anticipated the pre-
eminence of the United States in the twentieth 
century.35 Following his return to office in 1880, 
he vexed the empire-minded Conservatives by the 
readiness with which he accepted the return of 
the Transvaal to Afrikaner rule.36 Gladstone was 
more accepting of openness and diversity than the 
imperialists of his day. He was deeply sensible of 
the distinctive and non-English national cultures 
and spiritual complexion of Scotland, Wales, and 
Ireland. Across the North Sea, “Kuyper,” according 
to James Bratt, “admired no one in politics more 
than Gladstone.”37 
Opposition within his own party to his advo-
cacy of “home rule” for Ireland eventually split the 
Liberal Party in 1886 and thereby denied it office.38 
It was the Conservatives—the party of empire—
who dominated British politics thereafter for al-
most all of the time down to 1905/6 and who went 
to war in 1899. The “Liberal Imperialist” faction, 
within the Liberal party, was amongst those who 
were not in accord with the Gladstone-like ap-
proach to Ireland. In retrospect, it is hard not to 
reflect on how much happier Anglo-Irish relations 
might have been if Gladstone’s proposals, or some-
thing like them, had carried the day in the nine-
teenth century. Arguably Britain’s greatest Prime 
Minister in the nineteenth century, Gladstone 
showed his fellow countrymen an alternative way 
to imperialism, but his wisdom was rejected. The 
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tragic consequences remain beyond human calcu-
lation. 
 Winston S. Churchill had seen action in the 
South African conflict and was not without ad-
miration for Great Britain’s Afrikaner enemies. In 
his maiden speech to the House of Commons on 
February 18, 1901 he startled members by declar-
ing, “if I were a Boer I hope I should be fighting in 
the field.”39 Of the Afrikaners he wrote, “I do sym-
pathize with their love of freedom.”40 There are sug-
gestions that Churchill—who certainly did not get 
everything right, but whom his fellow countrymen 
rightly revere for his early warnings of the Nazi threat 
and effective leadership at the crucial juncture—was 
haunted by a sense of the long-term consequences of 
Great Britain’s aggression in South Africa. Even in 
the critical years of 1940-41, his mind could turn to 
the roots of Great Britain’s dire situation as they lay 
in earlier policies. After June 1940, with France pros-
trate and Germany triumphant over much of the 
European continent, and with Russia not yet in the 
war, it was more than obvious that Great Britain’s 
lifeline was the United States. 
At this critical point, President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt (1882-1945) appointed Harry Hopkins 
(1890-1946) as his personal intermediary with 
Churchill. Hopkins was born in Sioux City and 
raised in Grinnell, Iowa. On January 25, 1941, 
Churchill was discoursing late into the night with 
Harry Hopkins, who was visiting him in England. 
In the course of a wide-ranging and reflective con-
versation, as recorded by the ever meticulous Jack 
Colville (1915-87), then Assistant Private Secretary 
to the Prime Minister, Churchill ruminated rue-
fully that “Joseph Chamberlain had pushed us 
into the Boer War and, by setting Europe against 
us, had stimulated the Germans into building a 
fleet.”41 If we take these words at face value, and 
ponder with care their weighty implications, they 
should serve to drive us to a profound reassessment 
of British policy for the two decades commencing 
in 1895. 
From 1945 onwards, Churchill was once again 
out of office—but now the Red Army was in the 
heart of Europe. If we exchange “Red” for “Tsarist,” 
we need to acknowledge that this was precisely the 
kind of outcome only to be expected if the policies 
pursued by Grey and desired by his entente part-
ners in 1914 had been wholly successful. In 1947 
Churchill reported to those closest to him that he 
had dreamt of having a conversation with his much-
revered father, Lord Randolph Churchill (1849-95). 
So vivid was the experience that Churchill recorded 
it in detail.42 In the course of his account of the 
wide-ranging conversation, which had much to say 
about Russia, occurs the following exchange, con-
cerning the policy of Joseph Chamberlain in South 
Africa in 1899: [son:] “We conquered the Transvaal 
and the Orange Free State”; [father:] “England 
should never have done that. To strike down two 
independent republics must have lowered our 
whole position in the world. It must have stirred up 
all sorts of things. I am sure the Boers made a good 
fight.”43 Arguably, these words reflected Churchill’s 
deeper sense that the consequences of British im-
perial aggression in South Africa had been highly 
detrimental also to Great Britain herself. 
As we approach the 2014 centenary of the out-
break of war in Europe in 1914, there is already a 
rising tide of literature on its origins. As succeed-
ing generations have taken a longer view of these 
things, it has become easier to see how many evils 
have flowed from the Great War, the manner in 
which it was waged, and the dictated peace settle-
ment. These included the collapse, rather than con-
stitutional development, of Austria-Hungary, the 
association of democracy with defeat in Germany, 
the triumph of communism in Russia, the great 
depression, the rise of Fascist and Nazi totalitarian-
ism, the Second World War, and the ideological and 
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military division of Europe down to the fall of the 
Berlin Wall in 1989. God is not mocked (Galatians 
6.7); the consequences of some actions can be ex-
pected to play themselves out even unto the third 
and fourth generations (Deuteronomy 5.9).
It is to be expected that some of the new writing 
on the subject will follow the old line of Headlam-
Morley and the allied powers in 1919. Yet we have 
learned too much for the old over-simple “save little 
Belgium” standpoint to be accepted without a will-
ful ignorance of other features of the overall interna-
tional situation. We should now be prepared for new 
research to take us away from the old assumptions. 
 As to Edward Elgar, the “Great War” broke his 
heart. He had great affection for Germany. There 
his musical achievements were acclaimed long be-
fore his fellow countrymen recognized them. In 
later years he came to hate the way in which the 
arrogant words of A.C. Benson, “Land of Hope 
and Glory,” set to his “Pomp and Circumstance 
March Number One” (1901), were used during the 
conflict to boost morale in the face of mounting 
horrors. Those who would gauge his frame of mind 
on the morrow of “victory” must absorb the mean-
ing of his aching and poignant Cello Concerto in E 
minor, first performed in 1919.44
How we remember and memorialize is highly 
formative. This is why it is necessary to consider 
how our commemorative traditions can be highly 
deceptive. What nations, including their govern-
ments, say in commemorative events and monu-
ments can hide at least as much as they reveal. 
They can overlay what has been partly or even 
completely forgotten. Especially as the nations of 
Europe grieve their millions of war dead, their gov-
ernments may continue to resist the probing and 
sifting of historians. In the case of responsibility for 
the causes and consequences of the war of 1914, the 
more assiduously historians pursue their calling, 
the closer they come to confirming the profound 
but awful truth stated centuries ago by the Apostle 
Paul: “All have sinned and fallen short of the glory 
of God” (Romans 3.23).
As to my grandfather, he most probably went to 
his grave thinking that Great Britain had gone to 
war “to save little Belgium.” With all that has hap-
pened in the twentieth century, we in the twenty-
first century ought not to be misled so easily. We 
need to be wisely aware that commemorative events 
and monuments can mask as well as represent, and 
can entrench misunderstandings from which we 
need to be delivered.
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